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Abstract 
Recent studies concerning mathematical cognition show that we may find mathematical cognitive capacities in young 
infants and monkeys. They show that we possess an innate intuition of  small  natural  integers around the age of six 
month. Yet, if we speak of intuitions, they are intuitions of what? So, the target of my study is to try to clarify the role 
intuitions play in mathematical cognition. My claim is that the results of these studies endorse a form of mathematical 
structuralism; the actual world is mathematically structured.
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1. Introduction 
The following work represents an attempt to extract the philosophical relevance of some contemporary 
studies concerning mathematical cognition. In two recent papers (De Cruz & De Smedt, 2010 and Longo 
& Viarouge, 2010), the authors analyse the current situation concerning the results of various studies 
concerning mathematical cognition, holding that these results endorse their claim about the constitutive 
role of innate intuitions in mental processes involving numbers. This is an interesting result per se,
linking naturally mathematical cognition to mathematical epistemology, namely with intuitionism and
nativism. Yet, what I consider to be even more interesting is the fact that these contemporary studies on 
cognitive psychology endorse a form of mathematical structuralism, thus linking mathematical cognition 
to the ontology of mathematics. 
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2.  From mathematical cognition to the philosophy of mathematics 
The analysis of the previous mentioned authors is based fundamentally on two seminal studies: 
Dehaene & Bossini & Giraux (1993) and Wynn (1992). In the first study Dehaene et al. focus on what is 
called now in the literature the SNARC Effect.  The SNARC Effect suggests that people represent 
numbers in the form of an imaginary number line. (SNARC = Spatial–Numerical Association of 
Response Codes). Basically, the experiment consists in asking (adult) people to indicate if a digit is odd 
or even. The result is that the subjects respond faster to large numbers with their right hand, and faster to 
small numbers with their left hand. Based on this result, the authors claim that this must be so because 
respondents are imagining the numbers on a number line, where smaller numbers are always to the left. 
Further experiments done in this direction indicate that: the experiment also works for negative numbers 
(Shaki & Petrusic, 2005), and the direction of the line is culturally dependent (Zebian, 2005). 
What I think is important here to be noticed is that, since we commonly order numbers in an imaginary 
line, this result suggests that in order to mentally process numbers (discrete quantities), we need to 
previously arrange them in a line (continuous quantity). This further implies the existence of an 
interesting fact concerning mathematical cognition, namely that we first epistemically assimilate 
continuous lines, and only afterwards identify discrete points (on them). 
The second type of experiment was done by Karen Wynn, and concerns the detection of basic 
arithmetical abilities (addition/subtraction) with small integers (1,2,3,4) in young infants (5-6 month old). 
The experiment is based methodologically on the violation of the expectation paradigm: the assumption 
that the subjects look longer at events that they do not expect because these events are more interesting to 
them. This has been generally seen as a common property of the human perceptual system that, for 
instance, magicians and orators rely on to capture the attention of their audience. So, Wynn exposed small 
infants to simple arithmetic events and measured their looking time. For instance, in Wynn’s experiment, 
infants witnessed how a doll was placed on a stage. A curtain has rising, hiding the doll.  Then they saw 
how a second doll was visibly placed behind the curtain. If infants can perform the addition 1+1= 2, then 
they should expect to see two objects (dolls in this case) once the curtain is lowered. This difference in 
looking time is attributed to a capacity of the infants to discriminate between correct (two dolls) and 
incorrect (one or three dolls) basic arithmetic operations. Based on the results of this experiment, Wynn 
claims that small infants have the ability to perform simple arithmetic operations (subtraction and 
addition) with small numbers (1, 2, 3 and 4). Further experiments done in this direction indicate that: the 
experiment works also for larger numbers (up to 10) (McCrink & Wynn, 2004). Similar results have been 
obtained in the case of animals, mostly monkeys and dogs; for an overview, see Feigenson & Dehaene & 
Spelke, 2004, or Carey, 2009, especially pp.119-124) 
It is important is to be noticed here that we seem to have these innate pre-verbial arithmetical 
capacities to compute small integers. Moreover, it is interesting here to notice that we share these 
mathematical innate capacities with other non-human beings. Inneism (or nativism) means that we could 
find in humans and other species some form of innate knowledge, namely that we are born with a form of 
mathematical knowledge, which is not acquired through experience, but inherited. As Stanislas Dehaene 
has put the point, "[I]t seems impossible for an organism that ignores all about numbers to learn to 
recognize them. It is as if one asked a black-and-white TV to learn about colors!" (Dehaene, 1997, 61-
62).
What is also interesting to be noticed in all these series of experiments is that their results go against 
the claims of various scholars who tie mathematics to logic and/or language. The process is thus exactly 
at  odds  with  the  traditional  way  in  which  it  was  thought  that  we  first  grasp  the  elements  and  only  
afterwards we combine them in sets according with a selection criterion which most often it is a common 
trait  of  the  elements.  Here,  on  the  contrary,  we have  first  the  mental  grasp  of  a  structure  and only  after  
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then it is said that we can construct points and lines and numbers. For instance, Jean Piaget believed that 
numerical representations come from logical capacities to order linearly and to represent and operate over 
collections of elements. Certainly, these logical and linguistic capacities are not present in humans until 
the early school years. Piaget thus claimed that small children could not mentally grasp numbers in an 
adequate way, and, in this sense, provides his famous work on number conservation as evidence for his 
view (Piaget, 1952).  
Another famous example in this sense is perhaps Penelope Maddy. As Longo & Viarouge have put it: 
“P. Maddy proceeds by “common sense”. With a bias, rooted in the purported centrality of Set Theory in 
the foundations of Mathematics, she sees the objects of the world coming together in sets, in front of our 
eyes, collected by predicates.” (Longo & Viarouge, 2010, 23). This way of constructing sets out of 
collections of elements which share the same property may be cognitively present in mature human 
beings, yet the richness of empirical data concerning young infants goes against this hypothesis. (For 
more see Maddy, 1997, and for more about Maddy’s approach see Tieszen, 2005).  
Concerning nativism, I do not want to enter here into the discussion concerning what is inherited and 
what is acquired with regard to our mathematical capacities, but only to mention that these capacities 
seem to be ontogenetically inherited, yet phylogenetically acquired through natural selection. What I want 
rather to discuss here is the fact that in most cases this inneism is philosophically seen as endorsing 
(Kantian) intuitionism. Dehaene, for example, thinks that what he calls ‘‘our number sense’’ works as an 
argument ‘‘against the hypothesis that our brain does mathematics as a logical machine’’ (Dehaene, 1997, 
322). These intuitions are not reducible ‘‘to the definition that [the axioms of Arithmetic] pose’’ (ibid., 
325). Further, the author specifies that ‘‘a formal definition is not necessary, we intuitively know what the 
natural integers are’’ (ibid., 326).  
Following Kant, we may say that intuitions are objective representations. Moreover, intuitions are 
singular, immediate representations, whereas concepts are general, mediate ones. So, intuitions are 
objective singular direct representations, yet, representation of what? They presuppose the pre-existence 
of objects, or at least of a possible structure within objects could be mentally ordered and perceived. 
Thus, an interesting fact about intuitionism as an epistemological claim is that ontologically should be 
accompanied somehow by a form of realism.  In  this  case,  based  on what  we have  said  so  far,  the  best  
form of “realism” would be structuralism. Structuralism is a theory in the philosophy of mathematics that 
holds that there are no genuine independent mathematical objects in the real world which parallel 
ontologically the existence of spatio-temporal physical objects, yet the actual world comprise structures 
which are in fact the subject of mathematical theories. Consequently, mathematical theories describe 
structures, and mathematical objects are exhaustively defined by their place in such structures. 
Structuralism is cognitively based on pattern recognition, (Shapiro, 2000, pp. 276-283) and this seems 
to be the mechanism we discovered in the previous experiments concerning mathematical cognition. So, 
basically we can talk about intuitions in at least two senses, both being mentioned by Kant. In the first 
sense, intuitions are immediate objective representations of something pre-existing in the actual world. In 
the light of the previous discussed experiments, this ‘something’ is not a thing but a relation among 
things, namely a pattern or a structure of  how we could  mentally  arrange  more  objects  together.  In  the  
second sense, intuitions are a priori forms or frameworks within we could organize our knowledge, so, 
they do not pertain directly to objects, but to the forms of our perceptual apparatus where we are going to 
absorb then in order to get to the objects. In both senses we are dealing with structures; both ways endorse 
structuralism. But why? 
The explanation for such processes is rather simple, and works along with evolutionary psychology. In 
the course of evolution, humans and other animal species which share the same environment have 
internalized basic codes and operations isomorphic to the (physical and arithmetic) laws that govern the 
relations of objects in the external world. In other terms, there are mathematical structures in the actual 
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world, structures which have been cognitively internalized due to their advantage offered in the struggle 
for existence of various organisms. Thus, our mind mirrors the surrounding environment, which works as 
an adaptation tool; it can better orient the organism and integrate it in a pre-existent mathematical order. 
What is important in this sense is to see that all these results concerning mathematical cognition 
presuppose this basic assumption that the actual world contain mathematical structures, and this is by no 
means a strong support for structuralism.
3. Some possible counter-arguments 
Summing up the discussion so far, it seems that modern intuitionism based on inneist arguments 
coming from the study of mathematical cognition leads to a form of structuralism: in order to be 
perceived,  mathematical structures should both be inherited and be in the actual world. 
Against this claim, one could launch three possible counterattacks. The first could be to say that these 
capacities to manipulate numbers may be inherited, yet they cannot be found in the real world, being just 
(social) constructions of our adaptable mind. A possible way to address this problem could be to say that 
this constructivism cannot successfully explain the presence of mathematical cognitive abilities in 
individuals of other non-human species. Moreover, if it is a mere social construction, then it should be 
limited to our integrated members of our society, i.e. adults, but then how could we explain the presence 
of these capacities in young infants. So, the recent results concerning mathematical cognitive capacities of 
young infants and various animals undermine this social constructivist thesis. 
The second objection could run as follows: mathematics, exactly as in the case of natural languages, 
may possess some invariant traits, yet it cannot be found in the real world, being maybe just a projection 
of our mind. In this case, again, the appeal to the results of the studies concerning young infants and 
animals would reject such an approach, for in these cases we deal with organisms which did not have 
acquired any natural language. It is true that most probably the acquisition of a natural language helps us 
covering the gap between the way very young infants and animals deal with small numbers, and the 
extremely complicated ways in which mature human beings could prove mathematical theorems or just 
manipulate large numbers. Moreover, it seems that mathematics is more than a natural language, having a 
king of universality that natural languages do not possess, so it is hard to link substantially the mastering 
of mathematics to language acquisition.  
The third objection could be that mathematical cognition as is known by us is specific and restricted 
only to organisms on Earth, yet it is not necessarily to assume that the entire universe embeds 
mathematical structures. The answer in this case should make appeal to a form of the argument of the 
indispensability of mathematics to science. Science is universal, science use intensively mathematical 
structures, and thus mathematics is universal as well. When doing science, especially physics and 
astronomy, we do not restrict the applicability of our theories just to our Earth. So, our mathematics is the 
mathematics of the whole universe, and thus mathematical structures are universally distributed. 
4. Concluding Remarks 
In conclusion, and in short, most of the results in mathematical cognition should be seen as endorsing 
a form of mathematical structuralism. The real world comprises mathematical structures, and we adapt to 
it by cognitively adopting this structures, so they have been internalized during evolution, and have been 
assimilated by our mind as innate capacities to perform basic mathematical operations. In fact, our mind 
mirrors the surrounding environment, and thus the actual world comes to our eyes mathematically 
structured. 
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